For everyone / PKL
Governance
Staked PKL votes, with quorums that scale with what is at stake and timelocks that give the community time to react. Six parameters are out of reach of any simple vote, and the defences have a stated limit.
Voting
| Rule | Value |
|---|---|
| Voting asset | staked PKL onlythe seven-day unbonding period raises the cost of a flash-loan attack |
| Cannot vote | treasury, incentive, reserve and unvested balancesinvestor tokens vote only once vested and staked |
| To propose | 0.5% of votable supplyor the endorsement of three delegates each above 0.25% |
| Quorum, parameters | 4%a proposal that fails quorum fails |
| Quorum, treasury spend above 1% of the treasury | 10% |
| Quorum, constitutional changes | 15% |
| Voting period | at least five days |
| Timelock | seven daysthirty days for the protected parameters below |
People who have locked up their PKL get to vote on how the chain is run: what applications pay, what the treasury spends, and so on. Bigger decisions need more people to turn up before they count, and every decision waits a week before it takes effect so anyone who disagrees has time to react. A small council can hit pause or block a decision, but can never move money itself. And a handful of rules are deliberately almost impossible to change, like the fact that no more PKL can ever be made.
The voting asset is staked PKL only, where the seven-day unbonding period raises the cost of a flash-loan attack. Treasury, incentive, reserve and unvested balances cannot vote. A proposal requires 0.5 percent of votable supply or the endorsement of three delegates each above 0.25 percent. Quorums scale with what is at stake: 4 percent for parameters, 10 percent for treasury spend above 1 percent of the treasury, 15 percent for constitutional changes, and a proposal that fails quorum fails. Voting runs at least five days. Timelocks are seven days as standard and thirty days for the protected parameters.
Votable supply excludes treasury, incentive, reserve and unvested balances by construction, so accumulation through those pools confers no votes. Proposal thresholds are a share of votable supply or a delegate endorsement; spam meets the threshold plus a refundable deposit. Rates in the application registry change only by a governed, timelocked vote on the whole tier, never per application. Verified applications elect two council seats and hold a consultative veto on registry rate changes. Grant recipients recuse from votes on their own grants.
The security council and the treasury
- A security council of seven members, at most two from the core team, on staggered terms, holds powers limited to pausing and vetoing. It never initiates a transfer of value. Verified applications elect two of its seats.
- Treasury operations run through a 4-of-7 multisig with published signers, a seven-day parameter timelock, and quarterly reporting.
- Any manual intervention in the buyback is published within 24 hours with a reason and is never described as automated.
What no simple vote can change
Six parameters require a supermajority, a thirty-day timelock, and published legal and technical review:
- PKL supply and the absence of a mint function.
- Burn semantics.
- The revenue-base exclusions protecting provider fees, royalties, service payments and user principal.
- Migration terms once published.
- The scope of emergency powers.
- The rule that registry status never touches the ability to deploy or transact.
The first two are enforced by the absence of code, which is stronger than any governance rule can be. The third is the one most likely to be attacked: a captured governance could otherwise vote to tax provider fees, extracting value once and destroying the liquidity base permanently. Burn semantics are in the list because they are load-bearing for the buyback, which reduces total supply and not circulating supply during the vesting years.
Attack resistance, and its limit
- Accumulation attacks meet non-voting treasury balances, higher quorums, thirty-day timelocks and the council veto.
- Flash-loan governance meets staked-only voting and seven-day unbonding.
- Proposal spam meets thresholds plus a refundable deposit.
- Low-turnout capture meets quorum floors.
- Council capture meets staggered terms and pause-and-veto-only powers.
Bribery and vote markets cannot be prevented
Disclosure and timelocks give the community time to react, and that is the honest extent of the defence.